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We should not think of environmental policy as an exercise in minimizing
the short‐term costs of environmental protection. Instead, we should think of it
as a means of stimulating sustainable technology, the sorts of technologies that
will enable us to meaningfully address global warming while achieving other
environmental and societal goals. We must fundamentally change how we think
about instrument choice in order to create a positive economic dynamic taking us
where we need to go in the long‐term.
This chapter will first explain why relentless pursuit of short‐term
efficiency through broad environmental benefit trading is in tension with the
goal of maximizing investment in our long‐term future and explore briefly one of
the many options for improving trading’s design. It will then put forward two
alternatives to Kyoto style trading to show how a goal of creating a positive long‐
term economic dynamic can lead to more imaginative use of economic
incentives. The first alternative, a Dirty Input Limit, stimulates fundamental
change by limiting the use of fossil fuel. The second alternative, an
Environmental Competition Statute, uses competition to stimulate a race to
develop the best possible technologies to limit greenhouse gas emissions.
Together, they illustrate that adoption of an economic dynamic leading to
sustainable development can productively and creatively improve
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environmental law, even in the instrument choice realm, where efficiency‐based
thinking has made useful contributions.
I.

Environmental Benefit Trading: Short‐Term Efficiency and Long‐Term
Environmental Goals

Measures maximizing short‐term efficiency do not necessarily maximize long‐
term welfare, because lower short‐term costs do not stimulate higher long‐term
benefits.1 Economists implicitly recognize that short‐term cost savings do not aid
technological innovation in their modeling of pollution taxes. These models
assume that an increase in the tax rate increases innovation rates.2 This makes
sense. Innovation is often costly and almost always uncertain. To develop
something new, one must invest in investigating an idea that has not been
proven, which means that it might not work out. Therefore, people tend to
choose to innovate when not innovating is costly enough to make innovation
seem worthwhile.3 This idea that high costs motivate innovation is consistent
with the induced innovation hypothesis that economists often employ in
analyzing innovation generally—not just in the environmental context.4 The
induced innovation hypothesis holds that producers tend to innovate in response
to scarcity, and scarcity raises costs. To put it more simply, necessity is the
mother of invention.5
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Economists’ assumption that high costs stimulate innovation is at war
with the assumption that broad emissions trading stimulates innovation more
effectively than a traditional performance standard of identical scope and
stringency. Emissions trading lowers the cost of employing conventional control
techniques by permitting polluters to reallocate their reduction responsibilities to
minimize costs, as we have seen. It follows that emissions trading reduces
innovation levels below what would occur with the same regulatory limits in
place without trading.6
As a corollary, a broad emissions trading design, which increases the
number of sources potentially generating credits, provides less of an incentive for
innovation than a narrow design.7 A broad design maximizes cost savings,
permitting a wide variety of conventional techniques to generate credits. A
narrow design limits the number of conventional technological options that can
reduce emissions, thereby increasing pressures for innovation. The California Air
Resources Board recognized this corollary explicitly when it established its
carbon dioxide standards for new vehicles. It refused to permit offset credits
from outside the transportation sector to count toward meeting its standard. It
justified this refusal by pointing to the desirability of encouraging technological
innovation in vehicle design. It recognized that allowing manufacturers to offset
rather than actually reduce vehicle emissions would cause the manufacturers to
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avoid innovative vehicle design in favor of paying for credits reflecting cheaper
and more conventional techniques for realizing emission reductions.8 It did,
however, employ a narrower form of trading to increase flexibility and lower
cost, allowing vehicle manufacturers to comply with the carbon dioxide standard
on a fleet‐wide average basis, rather than requiring each and every vehicle to
meet the standard.
This idea that short‐term efficiency and long‐term technological
development can conflict is not new to economics. For some time a debate has
raged among economists about whether a perfectly competitive market, which
would maximize short‐term efficiency, maximizes long‐term economic growth.9
The controversy arises because a very competitive market—i.e. an efficient
market— cuts profits, delivering low prices to consumers. But firms may need
profits to make investments in new technologies. Without these investments,
firms may be efficient in the short‐term, but may be quite static, failing to make
the investments needed for long‐term technological advancement and growth.
Thus, perfect competition, while a precondition for maximizing efficiency, may
discourage innovation.
The idea that emissions trading encourages more innovation than
traditional regulation comes from a woefully incomplete evaluation of economic
incentives. Trading proponents love to point out that trading creates an incentive
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to go beyond compliance.10 Of course, this is correct, but only with respect to
sellers of credits. Trading creates an incentive for about half of the pollution
sources, the ones with the lowest marginal control costs, to go beyond
compliance. It follows that trading provides superior incentives for those that
already have low marginal control costs to innovate.
Unfortunately, trading also creates an incentive going in the opposite
direction. It encourages half of the polluters to stop short of compliance—to emit
more than they would have under a performance standard regime. Trading
decreases innovation incentives for about half of the polluters, the
undercomplying buyers, to innovate.
One cannot analyze trading’s effect on innovation by focusing only on the
sources that overcomply, any more than one could analyze it by focusing only on
those that undercomply. Polluters that do not reduce emissions locally buy
credits to make up the shortfall. In a trading program, undercompliance by some
finances overcompliance by others. The Economist David Malueg pointed out
that trading reduces innovation incentives for half the sources almost two
decades ago.11 But trading proponents often neglect this point.
Since trading decreases innovation rates for about half the sources and
increases them for another half of the sources, the right question is: What is the
net effect of trades shifting reductions from high cost to low cost sources?
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Most importantly, trading decreases the net incentive for high cost
innovation, relative to the incentives that a traditional performance standard of
identical scope and stringency would provide. Under a traditional performance
standard the polluters facing the highest marginal control cost would have
incentives to adopt any innovation costing less than their high marginal cost.
Under trading, they have no incentive to adopt such innovations. Instead, they
will pay polluters with low marginal control costs to make reductions in their
stead. The only innovations that will prove worthwhile in a trading program are
those lower than the equilibrium price for abatement established by the permit
market. And that price will be lower than the marginal control costs of polluters
facing high costs under a traditional regulation, substantially lower in many
cases. Trading eliminates all incentives to make innovations costing more than
the relatively low cost of conventional pollution reductions established by the
trading market.
This destruction of incentives for relatively high cost innovation matters,
because development of technologies that can significantly increase our capacity
to address a major problem like global warming will tend to cost a lot, at least
initially. It’s not an accident that broad environmental benefit trading programs
have done little to promote renewable energy and nothing to promote nuclear
power. Development of nuclear power or renewable energy will likely prove

6

more costly than the cheapest conventional approaches for reducing emissions.
By referring to nuclear, I do not mean to express any view on its desirability in
light of concerns about nuclear accidents and radioactive waste disposal. But
some people believe that we will need to deploy nuclear power to adequately
address global warming and that the risks are manageable. If governments wish
to develop and improve nuclear power to address global warming, they will
have to do more than just allow it to generate credits in emissions trading
schemes. For an emissions trading scheme gives priority to low cost abatement
and therefore provides an inadequate means for securing investment in high cost
abatement with huge carbon dioxide reduction potential.
Many technological innovations that have significantly improved our lives
involved costly investments that ultimately delivered significant welfare benefits
at lowered cost. Manufacturers introduced automobiles as luxury goods
commanding a high price. Mass production to lower vehicles’ price sufficiently
to make their use for personal transportation common came later, and built on
the investments previously made in high‐cost motoring. Similarly, personal
computers followed investment in fiendishly expensive supercomputers, which
only large institutions could afford. In these cases, and many others, high cost
investment ultimately led to lower cost and significant improvements in our
lives.
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Investments that make it possible to address global climate change will
likely follow a similar pattern. In the short run, many investments that help
create technologies that can eventually provide cost effective substitutes for fossil
fuels will likely prove costly. These investments, however, will lower prices and
improve the effectiveness of the technologies involved. Indeed, this has
happened with just about all forms of renewable energy, because of policies put
in place specifically to stimulate these costly investments.12 We desperately need
these investments on a massive scale if we hope to cope with the challenge global
warming poses.
Emissions trading, however, will usually only stimulate such expensive
innovations only when all other cheaper options have been exhausted. Private
actors in emissions trading markets tend to purse the least cost abatement
options.
They will typically not consider the positive spillovers from investments
in new approaches that make them desirable for society at large. For positive
spillovers, by definition, are advantages that do not benefit the party investing in
the technology generating the positive spillover. For example, an investment in
new solar technology can produce ancillary benefits for society that justify its
high cost. Such an investment may build knowledge that will allow other
producers to make additional advances that reduce solar energy’s price or
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increase its utility (for example, making it more viable in cloudier climates). Since
market actors cannot predict these positive spillovers in advance and some of
these spillovers may benefit competitors, rather than the company making the
investment, project developers will tend to underinvest in this sort of innovation.
This idea, that markets often produce an underinvestment in innovation, because
the investor cannot capture the positive spillovers and innovation is an uncertain
process, is well recognized in the economics of innovation generally.13 But
curiously, analysts of emissions trading have generally failed to consider the
implications of these fairly standard lessons in the economics of innovation for
emissions trading markets. At a minimum, these lessons suggest that emissions
trading markets, like markets generally, will prove suboptimal in stimulating
valuable innovation.
Faith in emissions trading’s capacity to encourage innovation stems, in
part, from the myth that emissions trading provides continuous incentives for
innovation, something that traditional regulation does not do. In fact, to the
extent emissions trading encourages innovation, the duration of that incentive
precisely matches that provided by a traditional performance standard. Both
traditional regulation and emissions trading’s innovation incentive continues
until the compliance deadline arrives and then subsides. The incentive to reduce
emissions in a trading program comes from government commands to reduce
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emissions by a set amount by a date certain. Polluters are willing to pay for
emission reductions, because they must purchase them in order to comply by the
deadline, unless they reduce locally by the deadline. Some polluters will
overcomply, because polluters with high compliance costs will pay for a limited
amount of credits, the amount necessary for them to avoid local compliance, and
no more. It follows that rational credit sellers will only pay to produce enough
credits to meet this limited demand, as no substantial market exists for credits
not needed for compliance purposes. Once a polluter has met its compliance
obligation, either by purchasing credits or complying locally, no incentive exists
to continue reducing emissions.
Trading programs, of course, can lengthen the duration of incentives for
innovation by lengthening the compliance period. But a traditional regulation
can do the same. While the compliance period can be short or long, the
compliance deadline extinguishes incentives for innovation in both cases.
Of course, if regulators could be counted on to continually and
predictably tighten their regulatory limits, then a continuous incentive to reduce
emissions and innovate might exist. But this would be true whether or not
regulators use emissions trading as the mechanism to meet these continually
revised limits. In practice, however, polluters frequently lobby and/or litigate to
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delay or weaken limits, including limits to be met through emissions trading.
And regulators often find it difficult to tighten limits for a variety of reasons.
The limits of my claim about trading and innovation require some
emphasis. I am not saying that trading never encourages innovation. I am merely
pointing out that trading produces less powerful incentives for valuable high
cost innovation than traditional regulation of identical scope and stringency. I am
also claiming that emissions trading does not produce optimal innovation, but it
shares this flaw with markets generally.
One can address trading’s weakness in stimulating innovation by
increasing the cap’s stringency. A trading program reducing pollution by X tons
encourages expensive innovation less well than a performance standard
providing for X tons of reduction. But if one establishes an innovation premium
in the cap, call it P, such that the cap requires X + P tons of reduction, the trading
program would stimulate more innovation, presumably, than a trading program
under a cap of X tons. In order for a trading program achieving a reduction of X
+ P to produce as much high cost innovation as a performance standard
requiring X tons of reduction, however, X + P must raise marginal control costs
so that they equal the marginal control costs of achieving X through performance
standards. Since trading significantly lowers marginal control costs, the
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innovation premium (P) necessary to meet this condition will usually prove quite
high.
It is unlikely that the political economy advantages of trading will make it
feasible to adopt a cap with an innovation premium sufficient to offset the
innovation losses from trading (for expensive innovation). The increased
stringency deprives polluters of the cost savings that trading would otherwise
provide. Moreover, since polluters will likely have little or no information about
the marginal cost of reductions at others’ facilities that they might purchase, they
may evaluate a proposed cap of X + P in terms of the cost of making all of the
reductions at their own facilities, attributing little or no cost reduction to the
market. Their own abatement costs (not taking into account cost savings from
trade) will be much higher for limit X+P than for limit X. And vigorous industry
opposition to a more stringent cap decreases the likelihood of government
compensating for innovation lost through increased stringency. An innovation
premium is a good idea, but it may be difficult to obtain a sufficiently ambitious
premium.
Even if this can be done, market actors will not provide optimal
investment in innovation, because they cannot capture the positive spillovers
from the innovation. With an innovation premium, however, emissions trading
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should do just as well (or just as badly) as traditional regulation in producing
innovation.
In keeping with the prevailing practice in the literature, I’ve framed this
discussion as a comparison between traditional regulation and environmental
benefit trading. This approach simplifies my effort to analyze the central
tendencies of neoliberal instrument choice and to reorient our thinking. But in
truth, there’s little evidence that either trading or traditional regulation does a
great job of stimulating innovation. A serious effort to address climate change
may require more creative use of economic incentives to produce an economic
dynamic favoring sustainable development. To do this, however, we must not
assume that desirable innovation is an inevitable byproduct of mechanisms
designed to maximize short‐term efficiency.
Instead, we must design instruments specifically to encourage the
innovations that will make it possible to phase out fossil fuels. We have seen that
carbon dioxide constitutes about 80 per cent of global warming potential
weighted greenhouse gases currently emitted.14 For that reason, when scientists
analyze the question of how one would technically avoid dangerous climate
change, they focus almost entirely on analyzing the capacity of various
alternative fuel sources and energy efficiency improvements to displace fossil
fuels.15 Furthermore, absent a phase‐out of these fuels by the end of this century,

13

scientists expect global warming to be very dangerous.16 Mid‐range predictions
include sufficient sea level rise to inundate Florida, Manhattan, and other areas,
significant water shortages in the already arid west, the spread of infectious
diseases, and an increase in the ferocity of violent weather events, like hurricane
Katrina.17 And global warming could trigger feedback loops soon that will make
things even worse.18 Accordingly, scientists have been accompanying calls for a
phase‐out by the end of this century with a call for a 50 per cent cut below 1990
levels by 2050.19 Because developing countries will not cut emissions unless
developed countries show good faith and provide technological leadership by
going first, developed countries probably need cuts in the order of 80 per cent by
2050 as a prelude to a complete phaseout.20 Yet, perhaps because of a
psychological aversion to squarely confronting the need for such a significant
change, most of the instrument choice debate focuses upon abstract “carbon
abatement” policies, like emissions trading, which only address the idea of a
gradual fossil fuel phase‐out obliquely.21
We will stop using fossil fuels eventually, no matter what we decide. Oil
will run out at some point, and eventually, so will coal. These are non‐renewable
resources in limited supply. The only question really is whether we will phase
these substances out before or after absolute scarcity forces enormous price
increases and then makes them simply unavailable for any purpose. Replacing
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fossil fuels as soon as possible will yield enormous benefits. Every year we
continue burning fossil fuels we add carbon dioxide to the atmosphere, which
accumulates and remains there for more than a century, committing us to more
future warming. Fossil fuels also lie at the root of most of our most serious
conventional pollution problems. Phasing out fossil fuels would lessen or
eliminate particulate pollution (associated with tens of thousands of annual
deaths in the United States), ozone (associated with asthma and other lung
disease), hazardous air pollution (associated with cancer, birth defects, and
neurological defects), oil spills, non‐point source pollution, and destruction of
land and water from coal mining. We do not know how quickly oil prices will
rise or how quickly the price of renewables will fall. But we do know that the
right direction for society is to phase out fossil fuels over time. The economic
dynamic theory emphasizes that we should move in the right direction even
when the costs and benefits of doing so cannot predicted with reasonable
accuracy.

II.

Dirty Input Limits

We saw in chapter 7 that environmental benefit trading under the Kyoto Protocol
has tended to encourage end‐of‐the‐pipe solutions. This is not surprising,
because emissions trading focuses on end‐of‐the‐pipe control. It limits a
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particular pollution output. In this respect, it follows the prevailing model of
traditional regulation, which also focuses on end‐of‐the‐pipe limits, albeit
without the trading possibility. This section explores the idea of limiting the
inputs that cause global warming instead of the pollution outputs that constitute
the symptoms. We refer to laws that limit the use or production of an input
generating pollution as a Dirty Input Limit, or DIL.22
The climate change regime’s focus on end‐of‐the‐pipe solutions is in
tension with the teachings of the pollution prevention literature. This literature
points out that often pollution prevention—reducing or eliminating undesirable
inputs into polluting processes—can reduce multiple pollutants at once, often in
several different media. By contrast, end‐of‐the‐pipe control can transfer
pollution from one medium to another. For example, carbon capture and storage,
an end‐of‐the‐pipe approach under consideration to address climate change—
poses some risks of groundwater contamination, because it involves transfer of
carbon dioxide from air to land. Methods that avoid generation of carbon dioxide
in the first place, however, prevent pollution and contaminate neither medium.
The literature also points out that pollution prevention is often cheap.
Pollution prevention tends to involve fairly fundamental technological
changes. A focus on pollution prevention challenges firms to change their
processes—to change how they produce goods and services valued by society.
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Firms tend to like output‐based regulation, because end‐of‐the‐pipe control does
not require creative changes in fundamental processes.
We can require pollution prevention by imposing limits on the inputs that
create pollution, rather than the resulting pollution output. In particular, we
could limit the carbon content of all fuels, which would stimulate a move away
from fossil fuels with high carbon content like coal and oil. Or we could simply
limit the amount of oil and coal that the United States uses. Furthermore, we
could create allowances to use or produce these inputs, and make the allowances
tradable, thereby reducing cost and improving flexibility.
While this may seem radical, we have used DILs in the past. Indeed, they
figure prominently in our most well known environmental success stories, the
reduction and eventual phase‐outs of lead and of key ozone depleting
substances. In the case of lead, EPA first created DILs reducing gasoline’s lead
content and then gradually phased lead out. This phaseout produced a public
health triumph, as lead from gasoline played a large role in elevating blood lead
levels and associated neurological problems. Ozone depleting chemicals
threatened to deplete the stratosopheric ozone layer, which shields us from
ultraviolet radiation. This would allow ultraviolet radiation to increase skin
cancers, disorder our immune systems, and wreak ecological havoc. The United
States led the world to an agreement to limit the production of key ozone
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depleting chemicals under the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting
Substances. A few years later, the world agreed to phase out key ozone depleters
entirely. The United States, and the rest of the world, used DILs to accomplish
this phaseout. While a hole opened up in the ozone layer before the world had
acted, these DILs were very successful and scientists now expect the ozone layer
to heal.
These DILs unleashed significant technological changes, causing the
reformulation of gasoline and vast changes in a variety of processes using ozone
depleting substances. Thus, many analysts credit these DILs with effectively
stimulating innovation.
While the Montreal Protocol provided some authority to trade, no trades
actually occurred.23 The later phases of the lead phaseout, however, involved a
quite active trading and banking program, using tradable DILs, rather than
tradable emission output allowances. EPA authorized small refiners phasing out
lead to bank credits if they phased lead out more quickly than required and to
purchase allowances authorizing increased lead content from those who
overcomplied. While this arrangement delayed the phaseout somewhat,24 it
lowered the small refiners’ costs and increased flexibility.
DILs unleash technological innovation and therefore may produce
significant cost savings, because they focus producers on changing fundamental
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inputs into production processes. Indeed, the ozone DILs unleashed so much
cost saving innovation that in hindsight we think of the phaseouts of key ozone
depleters as easy accomplishments. But when the United States started to
address ozone depleting chemicals, they were used ubiquitously as solvents,
refrigerants, propellants, foams, and pesticides, and experts believed that finding
substitutes was either expensive or simply impossible.25 Moreover, the DILs
spurred significant technological advances even before the phaseouts came into
effect.26 So, a DIL can catalyze innovation even if they do not involve a phaseout.
Of course, as Professor McGarity’s chapter suggests, regulators cannot
accurately predict the magnitude of cost savings from technological innovation
in advance. The cost of a DIL depends on costs for substitutes performing the
same economic functions as the substance being limited or phased out. The
experience with ozone depleting chemicals suggests that once firms focus their
energies on finding appropriate substitutes, costs can fall to nothing—i.e. users
find alternatives that cost less than the substance that the DIL targets. This is very
different from the experience with output‐based measures, such as performance
standards and emissions trading.
Most analysts will tend to assume that a DIL phasing out fossil fuels,
however, will prove outlandishly expensive, because currently few cheap
substitutes for fossil fuels exist. The United States, however, need not phase out
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fossil fuels in the near term. It could modestly cut their overall use or just permit
no further increases in their use. This approach would send a powerful signal
that industry needed to innovate to find alternative fuels. It would likely
provoke some innovation and might therefore prove less costly than expected.
Moreover, regulators could then, following Professor McGarity’s suggestion, use
the cost experience from implementing a modest DIL to evaluate how much
further we could go.
The advantages of a fossil fuel DIL are most acute in the transportation
sector. Because output‐based limits are so difficult to administer, output‐based
trading schemes arising under the Kyoto Protocol to date have focused
exclusively imposing limits on power plants and large industrial pollution
sources. In the United States, however, transportation accounts for about 1/3 of
greenhouse gas emissions. Both in the United States and in many other countries
these emissions have risen rapidly, because of increased driving. Since
greenhouse gases accumulate in the atmosphere, capping rapidly growing
transportation emissions—i.e. limiting the total mass of transport emissions in a
country (and ultimately in the world) is extremely important. Yet, output‐based
cap and trade for transport is not feasible, because we cannot track each driver’s
carbon dioxide output in order to set up a tradable allowance system focused on
outputs. Nor can vehicle manufacturers or fuel providers comply with a cap on
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the mass of vehicle emissions actually released into the environment. A
combination of fuel characteristics, vehicle design, and driving habits
determined vehicle emissions, and no one party controls all of these variables.
Only a driver can limit the total mass of emissions released, and the driver can’t
readily change the practices of fuel providers or vehicle manufacturers; a driver
could stay within a cap by driving less, taking the carbon dioxide per mile from
her vehicle as a given. As a result, trading schemes have not included transport
emissions, and this sector’s emissions remain uncapped.
A DIL would permit capping fossil fuel use in the transport sector,
guaranteeing a reduction in the total mass of emissions within the polity
employing the DIL. For example, EPA could calculate the total carbon content
burned in the United States in a recent year. It could then auction off allowances
reflecting 90 per cent of the total carbon content of fuel emitted to refiners and
fuel importers.
This DIL, like all DILs, would create a ripple effect beyond the sector
possessing allowances. Because a DIL constricts output that forms part of a
production stream, it limits production and use of the limited input at every
stage from material extraction to end use. Fuel manufacturers would have to
change fuels in order to stay within the DIL’s limits and still supply the drivers
with sufficient fuel. The gasoline scarcity this creates would cause vehicle
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manufacturers to innovate as well, as fuel efficiency and flex fuel vehicles would
become a necessity. If the innovation this unleashed contains costs sufficiently
(vehicle efficiency improvements, in particular, would likely have that impact),
then consumers would not be affected. If costs rose, this would put pressure on
drivers to use public transport, ride a bike, or live closer to work and would
therefore put pressure on governments to fund mass transit.
Because producers of pollution inputs are usually less numerous than end
users, DILs usually will prove much easier to administer than output‐based
programs. In the United States, a program limiting the carbon content of
transportation fuels could be administered by auctioning tradable permits to
refiners, owners of natural gas pipelines, and fuel importers. This is a smaller
group of entities than those successfully regulated under the acid rain trading
program. Expanding the program to include coal processors, allowing rather
comprehensive regulation of fossil fuels would only produce about 2,000
regulated entities.27 Such a program is a lot simpler than the output‐based
trading mechanisms under Kyoto, which could, in principle, reach not just the
handful of suppliers of dirty inputs, but all of the downstream users of those
inputs where pollution outputs are released. And it would be far easier to
administer than the piecemeal program of output‐based measures that have
struggled to address the transportation sector’s emissions in the past.
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A fossil fuel DIL would provide a wide variety of benefits, going beyond
climate protection. Limits on fossil fuel production or use would ameliorate
environmental damage throughout the production stream. Oil extraction,
transportation, and refining damage land, water, and pollute the air. More air
and water pollution occur when the fuel is added to gasoline tanks and then
burned. Similarly, coal mining destroys water and land. When the coal is burned,
the power plants emit many more harmful pollutants than just carbon dioxide.
The U.S. regulatory system has struggled for many years to separately regulate
all of the pollution outputs stemming from fossil fuel use on a piecemeal basis. It
would be far more efficient to simply limit fossil fuel production at the source,
thereby simultaneously addressing all of these problems.
Adoption of a DIL will require a change in our thinking. If one’s only goal
is to reduce private polluters control costs for a single pollutant, than an output‐
based trading approach makes sense. After all, polluters generally have the
option of using a pollution prevention approach if it meets their output‐based
limit. For example, under an output‐based approach, power plant operators
complying with a limit on their carbon dioxide emissions could choose to switch
to natural gas—i.e. to change inputs. But operators of coal plants will prefer to
have the option of employing carbon capture and storage—an end‐of‐the‐pipe
control—if it proves cheaper (regardless of whether it’s safe and effective). If one
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accepts the prevailing quick fix mentality, then the polity should clearly permit
this choice, and DILs would not be applied in this sector. But even in this case,
DILs may prove worthwhile. Carbon capture and storage will not reduce the
impacts of coal mining on land and water, which have been devastating; coal
mining firms have removed whole mountaintops to get at coal. Carbon capture
and storage only addresses global warming, not the particulate, nitrogen oxide,
and mercury emissions emanating from coal‐fired power plants. By addressing
each of these problems piecemeal we complicate long‐term planning for industry
and strain the capacity of regulators. And carbon capture will not prepare us for
the day, admittedly long in the future, when coal will run out.
DILs make sense if your goals include sustainable development, long‐term
technological development, and efficient use of government resources devoted to
addressing serious environmental problems, not just achieving a single
environmental goal at the lowest possible short‐term costs. They offer a far more
positive economic dynamic than output‐based trading, as they are far more likely
to stimulate fundamental technological change than an output‐based system,
which accommodates, rather than fights, technological lock‐in.
DILs’ capacity to challenge the status quo, however, may create political
obstacles to their enactment. Leaders determined to seriously address climate
change, however, may overcome these challenges. Some states, such as
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California, may find such a reform congenial, because they see themselves as
environmental leaders. And if more Katrina‐like disasters unfold, the political
climate may come to favor the most effective solutions, even on the federal level.
Finally, effective political leaders may find that some firms, those with
substantial investments in alternatives to fossil fuels, can become their allies in
seeking to effectively change the status quo. The major petroleum companies
certainly have the resources to become big players in a move to alternative fuels.
It’s not inconceivable that even one of them could play the role DuPont is
reputed to have played in the ozone controversy, as a firm interested in change
because it can benefit from it.
Yet, government timidity in demanding changes that may require
substantial innovation has limited our achievements under a host of
environmental instruments, and this problem may well impose some limit on the
scope and effectiveness of DILs as well.
The next section addresses an approach specifically designed to allow
private sector initiative in environmental innovation to prosper even in the face
of government timidity in setting limits.

III.

An Environmental Competition Statute
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We have achieved a number of advances in material welfare because
entrepreneurs seek to get rich by developing and introducing innovations.
Examples include the cellular phone, the personal computer, and various uses of
the internet. Innovators’ ability to gain market share through productive change
is limited only by their imagination and capabilities in meeting potential
demand. Unfortunately, the free market rarely encourages innovations
improving the environment, because they usually benefit the public as a whole,
rather than particular consumers paying for favorable environmental changes.
An Environmental Competition Statute aims to stimulate a race to the top,
a competition to develop and deploy environmentally superior technology. In
order to stimulate this race, an Environmental Competition Statute authorizes
those producing products or services with relatively low carbon emissions to
collect two fees from competitors with higher emissions. The law would require
that the first fee fully compensate the lower emitting facility owner for the full
cost of using and developing an environmentally superior approach. The second
fee would provide a guaranteed profit for these investments. The government
would establish the rate of profit in the statute, by setting a premium above the
cost of achieving lower emissions. This premium would assure a reasonable
profit to any producer who achieved lower emissions than a competitor on top of
the basic costs recouped from that competitor. For example, if the government
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set a 10 per cent premium and a coal fired power plant spent a million dollars on
carbon capture and storage, the owner of that plant could demand that the
owner of a power plant with higher carbon dioxide emissions pay her $1,100,000,
the cost incurred in lowering emissions plus the premium.
For climate change purposes, the legislature should make this obligation
apply to targeted industries producing greenhouse gas emissions. For example,
Congress (or a state legislature) could authorize all power producers with low
emissions to recoup the costs they incurred in achieving these low emissions
from any power plant they choose that has higher emissions, along with the
government set premium. The legislature should require that emissions
measurement on a tons per kilowatt hour produced per year basis. Normalizing
emissions by production volume will avoid a perverse problem that might
otherwise arise. A small very dirty coal‐fired power plant might have lower total
emissions than a clean, but very large, natural gas power plant serving many
more customers if a simple mass‐based metric were employed. By normalizing
emissions according to production, the scheme would make sure that dirtier
operators paid cleaner operators, not visa‐versa. This scheme implies that a solar
power plant owner, which would have zero emissions, could collect her
construction costs from a coal‐fired power plant with high emissions.
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We could apply the same approach to the automotive industry.
Manufacturers achieving low carbon dioxide emissions per vehicle per mile for
the entire passenger car lineup could collect a fee reflecting the full costs of
improving their carbon emissions performance from whichever competitor
they’d like to target.
In order to maximize the performance of an environmental competition
statute, the term “competitor” should enjoy as wide a definition as is fairly
plausible. For example, manufacturers who make a lot of Sports Utility Vehicles
(SUVs) will argue that their SUV emissions should be measured against other
manufacturers’ SUV emissions. In other words, they will try to argue that the
relevant market involves competition among SUV manufacturers for SUV sales.
Lawmaking bodies should reject this claim. Individual car owners choose
between SUVs and sedans in meeting their personal and family transportation
needs. Therefore, the market should be defined broadly, to include all vehicles
that provide family transportation. This broad definition would encourage
manufacturers to either make fewer SUVs or drastically improve their
environmental performance (or both). On the other hand, it would be reasonable
to leave cement mixer trucks out of this market, as manufacturers of cement
mixers presumably serve a different market, as cement mixers do not work as a
family passenger vehicle. Cement truck makers ought not have to compensate
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passenger vehicle manufacturers if the passenger vehicles happen to have lower
carbon dioxide emissions (or visa versa).
An Environmental Competition Statute has the potential to encourage
contests to improve environmental quality comparable to the ongoing
competition to realize other sorts of improvements. It aims to allow the
capabilities of innovators free reign in improving environmental quality. It
makes it possible for anybody reducing pollution to realize a profit from doing
so. It seeks to emulate the economic dynamics of competitive markets, instead of
the efficiency posited in economic modeling exercises.
The statute also creates risks for those who fail to advance and innovate,
comparable to the risks faced by non‐innovators in competitive markets for non‐
environmental goods and services. Just as makers of mainframe computers must
adapt to the threat posed by PCs, or risk losing market share, those who fail to
adopt the latest environmental technology should lose money to faster moving
competition. This statute allows environmental innovators to prosper at the
expense of environmental laggards, thereby allowing environmental markets to
function like other competitive markets. In short, an Environmental Competition
Statute encourages competition to improve the environment.
Absent government regulation, free markets permit polluters to
externalize the costs pollution create. Exxon, for example, will not bear the full
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costs of global warming that its gasoline caused. The rising seas will inundate
Bangladesh and, closer to home, Florida, and homeowners there will pay the
costs, if they live. While Exxon externalizes its pollution costs, it must internalize
(pay) all costs incurred to limit carbon emissions. Therefore, if Exxon wished to
devote most its resources to developing alternative fuels, it would bear these
costs itself. No wonder that markets by themselves have failed to produce
significant progress on global warming, even though some companies have
voluntarily improved energy efficiency—a move that usually has no net costs.
An Environmental Competition Statute permits facilities to systematically
externalize pollution control costs, even significant costs, just as they now
systematically externalize pollution costs—i.e. the environmental and public
health harms that pollution causes.
Most existing law allows the timidity of government officials to limit our
environmental achievements. The law authorizes federal and state officials to
limit the amount of pollution polluting facilities can emit. The officials
administering these laws usually must take the costs environmental law might
impose upon our most antiquated facility owners into account in thinking about
mandating environmental change. They rarely, however, actively consider the
economic benefits those with newer technologies might realize from substantial
positive environmental change when establishing new standards. As a result,
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even when modernization would generate new jobs and greatly improve the
environment, government regulations only rarely demand significant changes in
approach.
Government officials often feel obliged when setting standards for an
entire industry to make sure that every company in an industry can meet the
standards it sets. While the law authorizes and sometimes requires regulations
based on the achievements of the best performers, government officials tend to
avoid aggressive regulation because of the political and legal problems that
tough standards might create. While in other areas competition tends to make
the best performers the trend setters, in environmental law, laggards have a big
influence on the quality of environmental performance.
This feeling of obligation and pressure from the judiciary leads to
standards not reflecting the full capabilities industry possesses to improve
environmental performance. Government officials often base their regulations on
the technical capabilities of pollution control technology. Government officials
often, however, have limited knowledge of industry capabilities to improve
environmental performance. As a result, they tend to demand relatively modest
improvement based on well‐understood technology. This has been the case, to
some degree, even under statutory provisions designed to force technology.
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Many policy‐makers associate this problem of government regulation
failing to encourage substantial innovation with command‐and‐control
regulation. But this timidity problem also limits emissions trading programs’
achievements. Emissions trading programs require, as we have seen, that
government officials limit the amount of pollution that regulated facilities emit.
Government officials develop these limits with the costs to old established
industry of making changes very much in mind. They therefore usually make
demands that do not require basic technological changes significantly improving
societal welfare. So, trading has not functioned to produce the kind of wide open
competition that has enriched people with new ideas providing material benefits
to consumers.
The same problem of government timidity would limit the efficacy of
pollution taxes. If the traditional U.S. antipathy toward taxes abated sufficiently
to allow them to be passed at all, government officials would have to choose the
tax rates to apply to pollution. They would probably find it politically difficult to
set rates sufficiently high to stimulate significant innovation in environmentally
friendly technologies. A tax program would provide a continuous incentive to
innovate, but only for a limited class of innovations, those with marginal costs
less than the marginal tax rate. Taxes would not provide good incentives for
important cutting edge technologies that would require significant investments
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putting their marginal costs above marginal tax rates, even if such investments
would lower costs and improve environmental quality in the long run.
The legislation should also forbid communication about how firms plan to
respond to the Environmental Competition Statute among competitors.
Otherwise, they might agree to do nothing, thereby eliminating the incentives to
compete. Violation of these provisions should carry very heavy penalties,
including jail terms for individuals committing deliberate violations. Such
communication should be regarded as proof of a conspiracy to prevent
environmental competition in violation of anti‐trust principles. Absent such
conspiracies, some companies with advanced environmental capabilities will
likely seize the opportunity to extract payments from competitors, thereby
starting the race to the top. Firms who do not view themselves as
environmentally advanced may start beefing up their emission reducing
activities out of fear of becoming a target.
The legislation should also seek to minimize litigation by providing a
dispute settlement mechanism, perhaps through mandatory arbitration. Disputes
may arise about who is a competitor and who has the lowest emissions. A
dispute settlement mechanism can prevent these quarrels from becoming too
distracting, even though actions taken to reduce pollution in order to get transfer
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payments or to avoid becoming a payer of one can prove productive even if final
settlement is delayed.
This approach can either address greenhouse gas emissions neglected by
other schemes or supplement them. It’s possible, for example, to use DILs to
require as much movement away from fossil fuels as government regulators feel
comfortable in requiring, while using an Environmental Competition Statute to
accelerate the innovation process to produce the newer, better, cheaper,
technology that would make stricter DILs than would otherwise be possible
plausible in the near future. Or, for that matter, one could continue with the
current output‐based approach, and use an Environmental Competition Statute
to pave the way for stricter future limits.
Those who think that environmental law should above all make sure that
we do not spend too much on pollution control will not find the Environmental
Competition Statute very congenial. It gives free reign to entrepreneurial effort to
reduce emissions, but apparently does little to constrain costs. In practice,
however, some cost restraint would exist. In order to be a competitor in one of
these markets with a legal right to demand payment, the entrepreneur reducing
emissions would also have to continue to make and sell a product. If the firm
spends so much reducing carbon that it goes bankrupt or has no customers, it’s
not a competitor and can’t collect a fee. So, a polluter cannot spend infinite
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amounts of money on carbon reduction under this scheme, only as much as is
feasible while meeting society’s needs for the goods or services produced.
Yet, this approach, by design, contains less a priori cost constraints than
typical government‐led regulation provides. The relative lack of restraint helps
this mechanism generate the rapid improvement in environmental technology
that we will need to address the daunting challenge of global warming. We are
not in any eminent danger of doing too much to avoid dangerous climate
change. We desperately need mechanisms that can move us beyond the slow
plodding limits of government decision‐making through cumbersome and oft‐
litigated administrative law proceedings.28

IV.

Some Concluding Thoughts About Instrument Choice

Allegiance to the neoliberal economic efficiency ideal has proven neither efficient
nor efficacious. We ought not to assume that measures designed to maximize
short‐term efficiency will maximize long‐term welfare with climate change
looming on the horizon. Since we have locked‐in infrastructure that destabilizes
the climate, the most cost effective moves from this decidedly inefficient baseline
will tend to perpetuate the lock‐in. We should instead aim to create an economic
dynamic that moves us away from fossil fuels to a future of much cleaner
technology. Recognition of the tension between relentless pursuit of short‐term
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cost effectiveness and mechanisms that will produce the needed investments and
experiments to produce a more sustainable future should inform American
climate change law, as we finally move to meet the challenge we have so long
neglected.
The mechanisms introduced here—the DILs and Environmental
Competition Statutes—present some fruits of the more creative thinking that a
focus on positive economic dynamics can produce. Adopting these approaches
can greatly aid our effort to make up for lost time. But these mechanisms are not
flawless and other mechanisms also have value. Renewable portfolio standards,
for example, have encouraged more use of renewable energy. And other
mechanisms no doubt will be put forth and adopted. We hope that future
policymakers focus hard on the question that this chapter puts front and center—
what are the best mechanisms for speeding a shift away from fossil fuel use?
Policy‐makers should employ an economic dynamic framework in answering
this question and seriously consider the proposals advanced in this chapter as
part of the answer. They should ask how they can create incentives for rapid
technological innovation and deployment, taking into account the full range of
incentives and institutional considerations that this chapter and this book
highlight.
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